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part."5 Observations about the multiform symptoms of this disease go back to ancient times. Sydenham cites a letter from Democritus to
Hippocrates in which it is said that the womb (the seat of the disorder for the ancients) is the cause of "six hundred miseries, and innumerable calamities."6 Hippocrates himself describes how the womb wanders around the body causing disorders in the various organs it encounters. 7 If interest in this curious disease goes back a long way in the history of western medicine, then so does its close connection with a theoretical interest in the nature of man. In his Timaeus Plato gives us an account of hysteria which is directly related to the physical description of the disease that we find in the Hippocratic writings. Plato describes the womb as an animal which becomes disobedient to reason and courses through the body causing disease. It is, desirous of procreating children and when remaining unfruitful long beyond its proper time, gets discontented and angry, and wandering in every direction through the body, closes up the passages of the breath, and by obstructing respiration drives [the woman] to extremity, causing all variety of disease.8
This account is closely connected with Plato's general notion of the soul as consisting of three parts (appetite, spirit, and reason), each of which has its own motions.9 Inactivity of one part, causes that part to become the strongest and results in imbalance and ill health. Plato's theory of hysteria fits in well with his account in the Republic (439d) of a war in the soul between reason and desire. Freud recognized that in associating hysteria with sexuality he was "going back to the very beginnings of medicine and reviving a thought of Plato's."10 For in Plato one finds something very like the Freudian conflict of ego and sexuality, though the teleological description of sexuality in the Platonic account, as bound up with desire of procreation, is foreign to the Freudian notion of sexuality. Freud insists that the sexual instinct exists quite apart from any procreative function.'1 However both accounts regard the ego as being opposed to a lower bodily soul which has its own desires and goals.
In the course of Sydenham's century, the seventeenth, the seat of hysteria shifted from the womb to the brain and nervous system. At the beginning of the century one still finds some of the elements of the wandering womb theory contained in Eduuard Jorden's A Briefe Dis- Corresponding to this shift in the location of the disease there is a shift in the analysis of its essential nature. Hysteria is completely divorced from any connection with frustrated sexual desires. At best sexual appetite receives brief mention as one of the purely physical perturbations which can act upon an already overly sensitive nervous system.'7 For most physicians of the period 1667-1765 the essence of the disease lies in this heightened nervous sensitivity which causes the nervous system to react violently to stimuli of various kinds. It is this sensitivity, rather than an unsatisfied sexual appetite, which was used to account for the predominance of the disease among women.18
At the same time it must be said that the nature of this disease as a mental disorder was clearly recognized, and is apparent in the description of the disease given by Sydenham, a description frequently repeated in eighteenth-century accounts of hysteria. theory, argued that "there is only one soul in us, and that soul does not have in itself any diversity of parts."25 The perceptions of will, desire, appetite, are reserved for the soul itself: there is no bodily soul in us with desires of its own. Strictly speaking there are no 'carnal' desires. The act of will is said to be the chief, or perhaps the only, operation of the soul itself.26 All appetites such as sexuality belong to the soul, though Descartes thought that their cause was a certain physiological process.27 The will can only act indirectly on the appetites by making changes in the physiological processes of the body.28 These processes must be understood to be purely physical, describable purely in terms of the categories of matter and motion. Anything that the soul suffers, that is passively received, is the result of purely physical motions. Thus all the actions which lie outside of the soul itself must be describable in purely physical terms. The Cartesian unconscious is purely physical. Descartes is best remembered for his strict division of man into a mind and a body which are entirely distinct one from the other. He bases this distinction on the claim that one can have a complete conception of oneself as a thinking thing quite apart from one's conception of matter, and one can have a complete conception of matter and material processes quite apart from any mental categories.29 At the same time Descartes always insists as much upon the substantial union of the mind and body as he does upon their division. In his Discourse on Method he writes that the mind depends so strongly upon the body that, if it is possible to make men wiser and more intelligent than they now are, it is in medicine that the means must be sought.30 The medicine which Descartes proposed was not that practiced in his own day, but one which was founded upon the basic notions of his mechanical physics. He sees this medical progress as leading to the prevention of mental as well as purely physical diseases. While Descartes does not believe that thought as such is produced by the nervous system, he does believe that disorders of the faculty of thought in mental illness are caused, not by the mind itself, but by faults in the mechanical organs of the body.31
Descartes is a major proponent of the mechanical theory of man. On the one hand the human body is held to be a machine or engine which responds in a reflex and frequently adaptive way to its environment. On the other hand man is said to have an active mind which, through knowledge of the laws of the operation of this machine, can correct and improve both the condition of the machine itself, and that of the passive part of the mind which depends upon it. Hence the mind stands in two kinds of relation to the mechanical body. The mind relates to the body actively like the pilot of a boat who guides it through knowledge of its various parts. Robert Boyle, who employs this image, claims that the mind is capable, "especially if instructed in the physician's art," of going beyond the spontaneous adaptive processes of the machine itself, and making changes to preserve it, and correct any faults in its operation.32 In the second place, as Descartes himself says, "I am not only lodged in my body like a pilot in his vessel, but, besides that, I am very tightly conjoined to it, and so confused and mixed that I compose with it a single whole."33 This union of the mind and the body into a substantial whole relates to the mind's passive receptive nature wherein it is dependent upon the laws of the mechanical operation of the body.
Descartes regards most 'psychological' processes as being dependent upon physiological structures and motions in the brain and nervous system. Among the psychological functions which he attempts to model in a purely mechanical way are sensation, memory and imagination, appetite and passions, and the automatic behaviour which results from stimuli from these various sources.34 These functions can all arise from purely physical processes. But even when these activities arise in the mind itself, as does the activity of imagination involved in geometrical reasoning, they depend upon the physical structures in the brain.35 And judgment concerning the veracity of our senses, freely suspended during the process of doubt to which Descartes subjects himself in the first of his Meditations, is itself dependent upon the memory by which we join our present with our past experiences.36 Such a memory is, according to Descartes' theory, dependent upon the traces left in the brain by these The objects of the senses constitute what Descartes calls the "most ordinary and principle cause of the passions."45 The object-stimuli agitate the animal spirits in an entirely automatic way causing a certain desire in the soul and certain disposition in the body to perform a certain action.46 The animal spirits of a healthy person are so constituted that, when stimulated by objects of the senses, they tend to form desires and actions which are adaptive in character. On Descartes' view the mechanism of our nature teaches us adaptive responses which we are to make in the light of certain environmental stimuli. Thus certain objects natu- rally cause fear, the desire to flee, and the muscular responses which serve to that end. But while our nature forms these original prima facie adaptive reactions, it does not always do so. Passions can become linked to other stimuli than their original ones through a process of conditioning.47 Thus we might become fearful and desire to flee in the face of an entirely harmless object. I shall return to this point. For present purposes it is important to realize that, for Descartes, faults in the bodily organs themselves can cause useless or positively harmful desires to arise in the soul. What is remarkable is that Descartes attributes such "perverse" desires to human nature itself.48 He gives the example of the person suffering from dropsy who desires to drink even though drinking will cause him positive harm.49 Descartes compares the dropsical man to a clock which fails to indicate the correct time merely because of a change in its hidden mechanical parts. But, in contrast to the clock, Descartes considers the man's nature to be positively deceitful in such a case since, having both a mind and a body, he desires what will harm his body. In attributing such a failure to the man's nature itself, Descartes is implicitly attacking a traditional notion which regards nature as a beneficial force, independent of the mechanism of the body, and always tending toward the good of the organism.50
Thus the difference between adaptive and reasonable responses to the environmental stimuli, and useless or positively harmful ones, reduces to a mere variation in the physical condition of the body mechanism. A qualitative difference of response reduces to a mere structural difference in the nervous system. Similarly inappropriate passions will differ from appropriate ones due to variations in the material conditions on which the passions depend.
Sydenham's attribution of hysteria to a disorder of the animal spirits appears as a logical extension of the mechanical theory of the passions. Hysteria is characterized by distinctive muscular contractions (the hysterical fits) and certain disorders of the passions. In the Cartesian theory normal adaptive muscular movements and normal passions are determined by physical changes in the animal spirits. Thus it seems logical to conclude, as Sydenham does, that "the disturbance and inconsistency of both the mind and the body" in hysteria is caused by a physical difference in the initial basic structure of the animal spirits.51 Sydenham stresses in particular the close connection between thought and the animal spirits: , 1664) , Boyle reports that it commonly happens that one hysterical woman, when she observes another undergoing a fit, will soon be "infected with the like strange discomposure."58 Elsewhere, in A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature, he claims that there are certain odors which will bring about fainting fits in hysterical people.59 These fits are so severe that the pulse is barely detectable. He also reports the case of a woman who fell into such a fainting fit merely at the sound But what is crucial in these cases is not the stimulus itself; for the same bit of matter can affect a normal person without the same consequences. For Boyle the pathological reaction depends upon the "peculiar contrivance" of the body which he likens to a loaded and cocked musket.62 Because of this peculiar contrivance the effects of very small disturbances can produce very great and abnormal alterations in the whole machine. The lady who suffered fainting fits when she heard a bell did so because of the "texture of her body in reference to physical sounds."63 The proof that the agencies operating are no more than physical lies in the fact that she was cured by merely physical remedies. And in the Free Inquiry . . ., where Boyle explicitly claims that the active elements in the human body are the fluids, he attributes the sensitivity of hysterical patients to certain odors to "the spirits and the genus nervosum."64 Clearly it was the attempt to say something about the cause of the "peculiar disposition" of these spirits which set the problem of hysteria for physicians like Sydenham and Willis. Boyle thought that if the full meaning of the mechanist hypothesis was grasped there would be no difficulty in admitting that the very ideas of imagination could bring about severe somatic disorders. He claims to have found a number of cases in the books of physicians to show "that imagination is able to so alter the imagining person's body, as to work such a disposition in the spirits, blood, and humours of it" to produce a disease which a person has very much feared.65 Boyle considered the ideas of imagination, no less than those of sense, to be merely physical entities which can bring about extreme changes in the body machine.
The role of imagination in the production of hysteria is taken seriously in an eighteenth-century account of hysteria which closely follows that of Sydenham, Sir Richard Blackmore's A Treatise on the Spleen and Vapours (1725). In the course of an argument against those who think that hysteria and related diseases should not be taken seriously, because they arise merely from delusive imagination, Blackmore allows that ideas can in fact be the source of the symptoms of hysteria.66 However he argues that this does not provide any real comfort to the sufferers of hysteria since the painful effect is not less real than if it arose from any other source. In order to help his reader understand how ideas can bring about real bodily change Blackmore reminds him how dreadful objects presented to the mind in dreams can, by putting the spirits into a hurry and confusion, "cause great inquietude and grievous pains."67 But clearly Blackmore considers the effects of images in the case of hysteria to be far more extreme than usual because of a difference in basic structure of the nervous system. Like Sydenham he thinks that the source of the disease lies in "the weak and too delicate texture of the nervous system and the volatile dissipable temperament of the spirits."68 This is the fundamental reason that, in hysterical people, ideas can have the severe effects that they do.
It should be recognized that the role of imagination in the production of passions and somatic effects of normal people was well accepted by the mechanistic philosophers. Boyle notes that the passions of the mind "are often excited by the bare, if attentive, thoughts of absent things."69 He claims that the memory of a "loathsome potion" excites such horror in him that he feels a slight convulsion in his stomach whenever he has the thought of it. But the clearest account of the role of past experience in the production of the passions of normal people was given by Descartes.
In 74 This suggests that there might be an incompatibility between the psychoanalytic view and the fundamental principle of the Cartesian unconscious; namely, the unconscious ideas must correspond to some brain structures. Moreover, from the time of this early work, Freud insists, along with Breuer, on the existence of a resistance on the part of the hysterical person's ego that accounts for the fact that ideas which are so full of affect are cut off from consciousness. This resistance is described in purely psychological language as an intentional repression of the traumatic ideas from the person's consciousness.75 Though this process of intentional repression is itself not conscious, it is difficult to see how it can ever be described in purely physiological terms. As the idea of innate perverse sexual desires tends to replace (or at least dominate over) that of traumatic experiences in Freud's theory of hysteria, the intentional processes of the ego become more important.76 For it is these processes that come to determine the difference between people who become abnormal and those who become normal. Such a description differs markedly from that which ascribes such difference to a difference in the structures of nervous fluids.
The structures and functions to which seventeenth-century philosophers and physicians attributed mental functions were almost entirely hypothetical. According to the epistemology of Descartes the presence of a hypothetical cause is not an irredeemable fault: he thought that, for purposes of practical arts such as medicine, a good deal was accomplished by assigning physical causes which could conceivably produce effects like those that are in fact perceived, even if they are not the actual causes which do produce those effects.77 In assigning mechanical causes for psychological functions he was satisfied with what we today would call a model. Descartes thought that such a procedure was justified because the real causes of such phenomena were too small to be perceived by the senses.78 It is however a good deal more surprising to find Sydenham, a physician whose methodological works ring with warnings about avoiding physiological hypotheses, turning to the animal spirit theory in order to explain the disorders connected with hysteria. One explanation of this lies in the fact that Sydenham was willing to rely not only on "the testimony of our senses," but also on "anatomical investigations of long standing."79 The animal spirit theory of nervous and muscular action was so well established that, despite various experiments which put it into serious doubt, it was still the prevailing view of nervous and muscular action in the mid-eighteenth century. But perhaps the real explanation of its resilience to experimental refutation lay in the need, felt by the leading thinkers of this time, to assign psychological functions to physiological processes. In any case one finds a number of leading 'empiricist' writers employing and even arguing for the animal spirit theory right into the eighteenth century.80
The methodological attitude of a seventemnth-century physician like Sydenham stands in marked contrast to that adopted more than 200 years later by Freud who, after spending a number of years doing empirical research which attempted to link psychological function with neurological structure, turned to a purely psychological analysis of diseases like hysteria. It seems that it was at least partly his empiricism which led Freud to label unconscious processes mental rather than physical. He claims that, while the physical characteristics of such processes "are totally inaccessible to us," there are solid empirical reasons 76 General Introduction, 353ff. Despite Freud's denials it seems clear that the importance of trauma has waned considerably from his earlier studies. 77 for applying to them the same "categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so on."8' He argues that premature identification of unconscious processes with physical ones would cause people to abandon empirical psychological research without having anything better to rely upon.
However there are good reasons to think that Freud goes beyond this methodological empiricism to challenge the basic "Enlightenment" conception of man and the nature of the human mind. Freud goes so far as to speak of the "insoluble difficulties of psychophysical parallelism."82 This implies that his application of psychological categories to the unconscious might be ultimate. We have also seen that Freud following Plato, considers the human being to be composed of an ego and a lower bodily soul from which it is distinguished. If Freud means to use the concept of "unconscious mental processes" in any ontological sense, to represent what really exists in the world, then the conscious ego would be opposed by a bodily will and bodily desires. We have seen that this involves the rejection of the conception of man and the human mind promulgated by Descartes, and a very different view of the nature of the forces which have to be mastered by the conscious ego.
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